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Supplementary discussion 
 
Relation to previous studies on probability distortion 
The present results help to explain and specify some of the previously reported data 
(Paulus and Frank, 2006; Berns et al., 2008). Specifically, the current data suggest 
that probability distortions occur with rewarding outcomes and are not explained by 
attentional mechanisms. Berns et al. (2008) varied the probability of shock occurrence 
between p = 1/6 and p = 1 and found deviations from linear probability processing in 
visual, temporal, parietal, and frontal cortex, cingulate, insula and cerebellum. All of 
these activations were compatible with inverted S-shaped probability distortion. 
However, the exclusive testing with probabilities greater than zero prevented 
distinguishing inverted S-shaped from U-shaped distortions. U-shaped distortions 
would be more compatible with accounts proposing that reliable predictors of shock 
or no shock attract more attention than less reliable predictors (Mackintosh, 1975). 
The current tests with the full range of probabilities (from p = 0.0 to p = 1.0) revealed 
reward specific and differential encoding of fully inverted S and regular S-distortions 
in prefrontal regions that do not seem to be explained by attentional mechanisms. 
The presently observed probability distortions occurred in well-controlled 
behavioral situations with actually experienced outcomes and differed partly from 
those observed in situations using verbal descriptions of choices (Paulus and Frank 
2006). This distinction is important, as behavioral work has shown that we often 
underweigh experienced but overweigh described low probability outcomes, 
implicating regular S-distortions with experience and inverse S-distortions with 
description (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kareev et al., 2002; Barron and Erev, 
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004; Weber, 2006). In agreement with the 
notion of experience being an important factor in the representation of probability, the 
present findings revealed not only description-compatible inverted S-shaped but also 
regular S-shaped distortions and experience-induced changes in neuronal probability 
distortions. The findings demonstrate the usefulness of behavioral tests with actually 
experienced outcomes for investigating basic neural mechanisms underlying 
probabilistic decision-making. 
 
Relation to lesion studies 
The present results are in good agreement with previous lesion studies nd transcranial 
magnetic stimulation that implicate prefrontal cortex in the processing of probabilistic 
outcomes (Bechara et al., 2000; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Clark et al., 2004; Hornak 
et al., 2004; Fellows and Farah, 2005; Knoch, et al., 2006; Floden et al., 2008). 
Prefrontal lesions change risk-related behavior when patients repeatedly make 
decisions with probabilistic reward (Bechara et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2004; Floden et 
al., 2008). Conceivably, prefrontal lesions affect risk-related behavior by altering the 
coding of reward probability. Gambling behavior may become more prevalent with 
ventral prefrontal lesions because the experience-conforming underweighting of small 
probabilities no longer influences behavior. 
